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Looking to the Year 2000:
Challenges for Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management
The pressures for change on the Canadian, U.S. and other advanced
industrialized economies in recent years have posed fundamental challenges to
many traditional industrial relations and human resource management policies
and practices. Increased global competition, the shortening of product life
cycles, the greater differentiation within product markets, the growing
importance of product quality and innovation, the volatility in currency values
and commodity prices, the availability of new information and manufacturing
technologies, and the changing demographics of the labor force are all
demanding changes in employment practices. These pressures translate into
demands on industrial relations systems for (1) labor cost moderation, (2)
improved productivity, (3) flexibility in the use of human resources, (4) a highly
motivated and multi-skilled labor force, and (5) sustaintd innovation in labor
management relations at the level of the enterprise.
The traditional industrial relations policies and practices in both Canada
and the U.S. grew out of the very different set of economic and social needs of
the 1930s and 1940s. The primary concerns of the collective bargaining and
personnel management institutions that evolved out of the earlier environment
were to (1) provide workers with the collective rights needed to improve their
wages and working conditions, (2) establish bargaining and conflict resolution
procedures needed to achieve labor peace and stability, (3) and to diffuse
professional personnel management practices across organizations. These
functions continue to be important. However, industrial relations systems are
now under pressure to perform these traditional functions and meet these new
expectations.
Given the changing nature of the economic and social pressures on
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industrial relations systems, it is not surprising that the 1980s have been a
period of considerable experimentation with new practices. Consider, for
example the following description of events in the U.S.
The early 1980s witnessed a significant change in the U.S. system of
collective bargaining and industrial relations. Front page news stories
frequently cited labor concession in collective bargaining that departed
from the pattern of improved wages, fringe benefits, and job security to
which the American public in general and union members in particular had
become accustomed. Highly regarded business periodicals dwelled on the
advent of new forms of labor-management cooperation at the workplace--
so much so that some proposed that a "new industrial relations" had
overtaken the U.S. economy. But at the same time the cumulative effects
of more than twenty years of declining union membership made it apparent
that'the American labor movement has reached a crisis. (Kochan, Katz,
McKersie, 1986; 3).
While experiencing similar pressures, the institutional responses of the
industrial relations systems of Canada and the U.S. appear on the surface to be
somewhat different. The impression is that the Canadian system has been more
stable than its U.S. counterpart (Adams, 1988a). Yet few, if any, analysts
believe that the pressures for change will dissipate in the future. This is
giving rise to an interesting and important debate in Canada: Is the Canadian
system destined to follow the U.S. pattern? Or, are Canadian industrial
relations practices sufficiently responsive to current pressures and therefore
likely to withstand calls for more fundamental changes? Or alternatively, will
Canadian industrial relations adapt in different ways?
This paper will review the responses of industrial relations in the U.S. and
Canada. This comparative analysis will then be used to explore the challenges
the parties to Canadian industrial relations are likely to face in the future.
Two perspectives will guide the analysis to follow. The first is a
perspective on the role that industrial relations and human resource practices
will play in the future of advanced industrialized economies such as the U.S.
and Canada. The second is a theoretical perspective about how to make
projections into the future of industrial relations practice.
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Advanced economies such as the U.S. and Canada now operate in an
international environment where they must seek comparative advantage through
development and utilization of their human resources. Failure to do so will
result in a gradual reduction in the standard of living for most workers and an
increased inequality in income and social welfare. Only by developing and
fully utilizing both advanced technologies and human resources can our
economies achieve the twin objectives of sustained improvements in productivity
and real incomes. In turn achieving these twin objectives will require a
continuation, diffusion, and institutionalization of many of the experiments and
innovations introduced in selected employment relationships in the past decade.
However, there is no guarantee that these innovations will diffuse in a natural
way. Therefore, in what follows, emphasis will be given to an assessment of
the innovations and a discussion of the factors that are likely to influence their
diffusion to broader employment settings.
History teaches us that industrial relations researchers should be
exceedingly careful about predicting the future course of events, given the
dismal record of past projections. No labor scholar of the 1920s for example
predicted the rapid rise of unions in the U.S. in the 1930s. Nor did anyone in
the 1950s forecast the explosion of public unions in the 1960s or 1970s in
either Canada or the U.S. These examples suggest that simple extrapolation of
past trends fails to capture changes in practices that tend to occur during
periods of significant environmental turbulence. Nor can we simply assume that
Canadian and American industrial relations will follow similar developmental
paths. This has been shown most clearly in the divergence between union
density rates in the U.S. and Canada between 1950 and the present (Meltz,
1984).
The theoretical lesson to be drawn from this and other evidence is that
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looking to the future can best be done through a model that allows for a range
of discretion or choice in the responses of firms, government policy, labor
unions, and individual workers to environmental changes (see Kochan, Katz,
and McKersie, 1986). Thus in what follows we adopt a strategic choice
perspective to analyzing the future of industrial relations and human resource
practices. This is done by focusing on the interactions between a set of readily
observable environmental trends and pressures and the strategic choices or
responses of the key parties in the industrial relations system. T h e
assumptions about the environment of the future that we start from are as
follows: (1) the internationalization of economic competition will continue to
intensify; (2) the pace of technological change will accelerate or at least
continue at the rapid pace of the 1980s and become an increasingly important
strategic variable for individual firms and national economies, and (3) the work
force of the future will become more diverse in demographic characteristics,
skill mix, values, and employment patterns. In the following sections we will
take up these each of these environmental trends and discuss the range of
options open to the employers, unions, government policy makers in responding
to them. In doing so special attention will be given to a discussion of the
research needed to better track and understand the interactions of these
environmental trends and strategic responses.
Environmental Trends and Their Effects
Internationalization
International competition has become an important catalyst for changes in
industrial relations practices in both Canada and the U.S. In 1986 22% of GNP
in the U.S. was accounted for by the sum of exports and imports compared to
only 10% in 1960. The comparable figure for Canada was 60% in 1986 compared
to 40% in 1960. Thus, the Canadian economy has always been fairly highly
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exposed to international trade. Approximately 75% of Canada's trade is with
the U.S. These trends are likely to continue in the future. Indeed competition
between U.S. and Canadian firms will increase further if the Canada-U.S. free
trade agreement is put into effect.
Yet the industrial relations institutions in both countries evolved in
response to domestic not international competition. The challenge was to
minimize employment losses due to wage competition within domestic product
markets. As will be discussed below, the type of competitive threats workers
and unions now face from international sources is more complex, involving not
only competition over wages and labor costs but also on the capacity to
innovate.
The conventional and still most profound effect of international
competition is to threaten the stability of industrial relations by making it more
difficult to "take labor costs out of competition" through traditional means,
namely, through the spread of unionization, pattern bargaining, or public
policies that set a floor on labor standards. For highly industrialized countries
such as the U.S. or Canada with workforces that demand high standards of
living, firms facing an open economy will therefore find it difficult to compete
on the basis of low labor costs.
Theories of comparative advantage predict that, faced with a labor cost
disadvantage, a firm will simply lose market share to competitors operating in
lower cost regions. This effect will be most pronounced in labor intensive
industries where price competition dominates. However, in reality, labor costs
vary in importance to total costs, price elasticity varies considerably, and high
labor cost firms have a number of strategic alternative courses of action to
consider. While a high labor cost firm may in the end experience a loss of
market share and lower employment levels, it can also seek to lower labor costs
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through gradual wage moderation or abrupt concessions, accelerate the pace of
automation to reduce labor inputs, reallocate its resources and leave the market
entirely to the lower cost producers, or seek comparative advantages through
other means such as by identifying market niches that can be served through
advances in product design, marketing, technology, or superior product quality.
Finally, a firm might form alliances with foreign producers to source some or
all of its products in lower cost regions.
While these strategic options are not neutral with respect to their impacts
on industrial relations outcomes, traditional industrial relations structures and
processes were not designed to cope with this array of competitive options.
Instead, collective bargaining and/or personnel professionals and institutions
have generally been relegated to cope with the impacts of these strategic
choices after they have been made by higher level executives, or as they evolve
in response to market shifts. Consequently, an important effect of intensified
international competition has been to highlight the gap between strategic
decision-making and traditional industrial relations practice. It is not surprising
then that a good deal of the experimentation with changes in industrial
relations practice that has occurred in recent years reflects efforts to respond
to these competitive pressures by closing the gap between these two levels of
decision-making. In the end, however, unless these efforts are combined with
corresponding improvements in productivity, real wages and employment can be
expected to fall. Let us now examine how the U.S. and Canadian systems have
adjusted to these pressures to date.
Labor Cost Moderation. The effect on industrial relations that is most
expected from intensified product market competition is to induce firms to
moderate wage growth and employment costs. This has clearly been the case in
labor intensive U.S. industries that have been exposed to growing imports for
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an extended period of time. For example, employment in U.S. apparel fell by
700,000 between 1960 and 1987 while average hourly earnings in apparel fell
from 73% of average manufacturing wage in 1968 to 61% in 1982 (Parsons, 1988).
More generally, studies of wage determination in manufacturing have shown
that both wages and employment have fallen in import sensitive industries over
the course of the past two decades (Vroman and Vroman, 1987). And in the
1980s, wage growth moderated further extending beyond import sensitive
industries to other major bargaining units. Estimates of the magnitude of this
moderation vary from an average of 1 to 3% below the "norms" of wage
behavior exhibited in collective bargaining in the previous decades (Mitchell,
1986; Kochan and Vroman, 1988). These same studies showed a reduction in the
wage premium produced by centralized bargaining structures and/or pattern
bargaining thereby lending support to the conclusion that the intensified
competition of the 1980s led to a decentralization of wage bargaining and a
focusing of wage determination on the conditions of individual bargaining units
or enterprises (Freedman and Fulmer, 1982).
Similar downward adjustments in wage outcomes have been observed in
Canada since 1982. Kumar (1987) has shown that annual rates of collective
bargaining settlements reached their lowest point in twenty-five years in 1984-
85. Compared to the wage bargaining in the U.S., Kumar concluded the
Canadian response was somewhat slower in developing but at least equally
broad based and long lasting. Although he finds similar patterns in the
processes of downward adjustment (i.e., less emphasis on cost of living clauses,
less pattern bargaining, more wage freezes and bonuses), he does not find
evidence of a significant structural shift in wage bargaining beyond what a
modified Phillips Curve model would predict.
Whether this moderation and shift away from the influence of centralized
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and pattern bargaining will continue into the future in either the U.S. or
Canada is still a hotly debated issue. Clearly, this is one of the issues that the
strategies of the parties will influence.
One set of strategies for reducing the labor cost pressure that has gained
attention is to shift from fixed wage adjustments or adjustments that move with
macro economic conditions (as do cost of living escalators) to various bonus or
contingent payment systems. Indeed, in both the U.S. and Canada there has
been some shift from wage standardization and fixed payment systems to lump
sum bonuses that are not built into the wage structure. There also has been
some modest growth in the number of compensation schemes that link wage
adjustments to firm, establishment, or work-unit specific movements in profits
or productivity and individual worker skill attainment. For example, a survey
of Canadian establishments (the Working with Technology Survey (WWT)) found
profit sharing in 25% of its sample, gains sharing in 10%, and pay for knowledge
plans in 8% of the sample establishments. In theory, such compensation
structures, if diffused broadly, should have favorable effects on macro as well
as micro economic performance. That is, contingent compensation systems
should help expand employment and control inflation (Weitzman, 1984).
Profit sharing has been implemented as a quid pro quo in a number of key
U.S. industries and firms, most notably in steel and autos. But most union
leaders remain skeptical of profit sharing unless it can be introduced as a
supplement rather than a replacement for fixed wage adjustments based on
intra-industry or labor market comparisons, or in addition to cost of living
(COLA) escalators. Canadian union leaders have been even more strongly
opposed to profit sharing, as was illustrated vividly in the 1984 auto
negotiations. While the U.S. autoworkers chose to accept a package that
contained strengthened employment security provisions and profit sharing in
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return for modifications in the traditional wage and cost of living formula, the
Canadian union chose to continue with the fixed adjustment formula.
While many economists continue to promote the spread of contingent
compensation because of its favorable economic features, most industrial
relations scholars do not expect broad diffusion of these pay practices unless
complementary changes in management practices are achieved that gain and
sustain workers' trust and confidence in these pay systems. Two changes are
cited most often.
First, contingent pay systems require a sharing of greater information on
current financial performance and future business plans. This in turn opens the
door to questioning of these data and plans by workers and/or their
representatives and thereby joins the debate over whether worker
representatives should have an active presence in the managerial decision-
making bodies and processes in which these plans are designed and administered.
In the absence of more open access to information and an opportunity to
influence these plans, workers and union leaders are likely to continue to prefer
contractually specified and fixed wage adjustments.
Second, contingent compensation systems sharpen concerns over internal
equity, particularly concerns over differential treatment of executives and the
rest of the salaried and hourly workforce. This has been vividly illustrated by
the recent sequence of events in U.S. auto negotiations. In 1982 and again in
1984, years in which General Motors bargained hard with the United Auto
Workers (UAW) to set aside their traditional wage adjustment formulas and
accept a profit sharing plan, GM's announcement of executive bonuses created a
strong outcry from UAW leaders and members. In later years this outcry
continued since the GM profit sharing formula produced only small annual
bonuses for rank and file workers while executive bonuses continued. The
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pressure from blue collar workers led GM to modify its executive bonus formula
in ways that reduce the weight given to short term profits and increases the
importance of longer run objectives. In 1988 bargaining, Chrysler and the
UAW joined this issue directly. The parties negotiated a contract clause that
ties executive compensation adjustments to rank and file profit sharing formula.
Executives will not receive bonuses in years the company's performance fails to
yield profit sharing bonuses for blue collar workers.
North American employers have long been criticized for the large salary
differentials that separate top executives from middle managers and hourly
employees. These differentials tend to be considerably larger than those found
in Japan or in most other European countries. Moreover, the gap widened in
both the U.S. and in Canada in the past decade. In the U.S., for example,
since 1981, compensation for chief executives increased at an annual rate of
approximately 10% compared to increases of 5.9% for lower level managers and
executives and 4.4% for blue collar workers(Hay, 1988; Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1988). The same trend was observed in Canada, although the
differentials were not as great. Compensation increased for senior executives
14.3% annually between 1975 and 1987 compared to 9.9% for lower level
managers and 7.8% of production workers (Kumar and Coates, 1986). These
widening pay differentials therefore make it all the more difficult to generate
blue collar worker and union leader support for contingent compensation
arrangements.
All these data suggest that while Pressures for wage moderation will
continue in both Canada and the U.S. and will be especially felt in industries
open to international competition, countervailing equity and real income
pressures are also building within both countries. Whether new compensation
practices that involve contingent pay and new institutional arrangements that
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support such payment schemes spread to broader settings will depend on the
willingness of management and labor to institute the institutional changes and
reforms needed to support such plans. At this juncture, there seems little
enthusiasm on the part of either labor or management leaders to make these
changes.
No one expects that wage moderation or shifts to contingent payment
structures alone would be sufficient to cope with international competition.
The size of the gaps between manufacturing wages in the U.S. or Canada and
newly industrialized countries such as Mexico (10%), South Korea (13%), or
Taiwan (16%) cannot be closed by slower growth in wages or by changes in
wage structures alone. More significant structural and strategic adjustments are
required, most of which again challenge traditional industrial relations patterns
and institutional practices. We now turn to an examination of experience with
these to date.
Strategic Restructurina. Tne most widely discussed strategic response to a
comparative disadvantage on labor costs is to seek comparative advantage
through product differentiation or market segmentation by producing goods
and/or services that can demand a price premium. A shift to this strategy
requires considerable adaptability and flexibility in all aspects of organizational
behavior, including industrial relations and human resource practices (Piore and
Sabel, 1984). Firms that emphasize these strategies can be expected to seek
flexible work organization practices, cooperative relations both among workers,
technical staff, and managers within organizations and among organizations in
the value added chain, and a high quality workforce that can make effective
use of advanced technologies. We will discuss the role of these industrial
relations attributes more intensively in the next section when we focus on the
role of new technologies, however, we note them here because their
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importance is reinforced by the pressures international competition puts on U.S.
and Canadian organizations to sustain comparative advantage in areas other than
equalization or minimization of labor costs.
In reality, it is seldom a discrete choice between competing on the basis
of flexibility, market segmentation and high quality or on the basis of mass
production of low cost standardized goods. Instead, strategic restructuring
cases usually involve both efforts to reduce labor costs by trimming employment
and by restructuring human resource and industrial relations policies to
improve quality, flexibility, and adaptability. Consider one of the cases cited as
a successful example of strategic restructuring and implementing many of these
changes: the Ford Motor Company.
In the early 1980s Ford experienced a deep economic crisis that threatened
its very survival as a world-wide auto manufacturer. In response Ford:
(1) drastically reduced its labor force by about 42% from its peak
level of employment in the 1970s,
(2) negotiated a new labor agreement with the UAW that introduced
profit sharing, new employment security provisions such as a job
bank and guaranteed income stream for senior workers permanently
laid off because of technological change, plant closing, or other
corporate restructuring actions,
(3) endorsed and expanded its commitment to working with the UAW
to promote employee involvement, statistical process control and
quality improvement efforts,
(4) established mutual growth forums for communicating with worker
and union leaders at plant and corporate levels, and-
(5) greatly expanded its training and education programs.
In addition, changes were made in the structure of the managerial and technical
organizations to facilitate the use of cross-functional teams to speed the
introduction of key new products (such as the Taurus and Sabel models) on
which the company was to depend for its economic recovery. Relations with
suppliers were revamped by reducing the number of suppliers, developing longer
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term contracts, and working intensively with suppliers to both reduce costs and
to raise quality and service delivery performance (Locke, Kochan, and Heye,
1988). Thus, significant corporate restructuring involves both major employment
reductions and adjustments as well as innovations in industrial relations and
human resource practices. The question this and similar examples pose for both
researchers and policy makers is: How many firms and unions are willing and
able to integrate and manage corporate restructuring and industrial relations
policies in this way?
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The most immediate question
concerning internationalization relates to the potential effects of the proposed
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The macro-economic estimates of the
effects of the agreement on the Canadian economy vary from slightly positive
(Wigle, 1988) to somewhat positive (Cox and Harris, 1986). These macro
estimates are of little value, however, for anticipating the impact of the
agreement on industrial relations in specific firms or industries. Moreover,
since the macro models are based on assumptions of perfect adjustment of labor
and capital resources, they ignore the very issues that labor and management
representatives worry most about, namely the costs of adjustment to current
Canadian workers and employers.
Canadian labor leaders are strongly opposed to free trade with the U.S.
largely because they fear it will intensify cost competition and thereby will lead
to a more aggressive managerial approach to industrial relations. This could
happen either through a change in outlook and practices of Canadian managers
or through an increase in the influence an/or rate of entrance of U.S.
employers in Canada. In either case the fear is that the experiences of
nonunion competition and deregulation that have created strong pressures on
unions and collective bargaining in the U.S. could be exported to Canada.
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These concerns are very likely well grounded. However, they are based on
the premise that the dominant form of competition between U.S. and Canadian
firms is inter-industry competition based on relative factor prices (labor costs).
Yet some have argued that, given the similar stages of development of the
Canadian and U.S. economies, the biggest increases in trade may be of the
intra-industry variety. In this type of trade the competitive threat comes less
from factor cost advantages than from a competitor's ability to adapt quickly to
meet specific needs of different market segments or to develop and effectively
utilize advanced technologies. Thus one effect of the Free Trade Agreement
might be to further increase the importance of those industrial relations
attributes that support these types of strategic adjustments. If this is the case,
the Free Trade Agreement will intensify the pressure on Canadian labor and
management to engage in the types of strategic restructuring described above
and the processes of organizational innovation discussed below as essential in
firms that seek to gain competitive advantage from advanced technologies.
New Technology
Adjustment to technological change has been an ongoing feature of both
the Canadian and U.S. industrial relations systems. Collective bargaining
agreements in both countries contain a wide variety of employment and income
security provisions to deal with the impacts of technological change. One can
legitimately ask, therefore, is there anything new or special about the current
wave of innovations in technology that require new responses or significant
institutional reforms? Or is it simply that the pace of technological change has
intensified because of innovations in micro-electronics?
Clearly, no one discounts the importance of continuing to expand the
standard provisions for coping with the impacts of new technology. Indeed,
these provisions are likely to take on increased importance in collective
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bargaining and human resource planning in the future. Yet there is growing
theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that significant changes in
organizational and industrial relations practices will be required if technology is
to be exploited as a strategic resource. The central proposition in this theory
is that the full potential of new technology can only be reached by adopting
new organizational forms that effectively integrate technology and human
resource strategies and practices. Unfortunately, as the results reviewed below
will suggest, American firms have not yet done well in applying this proposition.
Data from the auto industry provide a snapshot of this evidence.
A number of studies have shown that the best performing auto
manufacturing plants are not those that employ the most sophisticated
technology. In an early study, for example, Krafcik (1988) showed that the
Toyota-GM joint venture known as NUMMI (New United Motors Manufacturing
Inc.) achieved higher productivity and quality levels than both traditional
industrial relations/low technology plants and traditional industrial
relations/high technology plants. This was the case even though NUMMI
employed significantly less new information and robotic technology than the
most advanced plants in the U.S. Later research, drawing on a broader sample
of U.S., Japanese, and European plants, verified this preliminary conclusion by
showing that plants that used a combination of human resource and
manufacturing process innovations such as team forms of work organization,
statistical quality control, and decentralization of quality control to production
line workers contributed more to explaining variance in productivity and quality
performance than did the extent of robotics technology found in the plant
(Krafcik, 1988). Using a different methodology Loveman (1988) and Roach
(1987) both concluded that investments in information technologies have
achieved very poor economic returns compared to other forms of capital
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investment. Thus, together these studies provide empirical support to the
proposition that investment in technology alone is unlikely to provide the
economic benefits needed to gain strategic advantage.
A better theoretical understanding of these results has begun to emerge
from a number of qualitative case study comparisons of U.S. and Japanese
managed auto assembly plants operating in Canada and the U.S. Shimada and
MacDuffie (1987), for example, use a concept of "humanware" to capture the
interdependence between the technical and human resource systems observed in
Japanese manufacturing systems. They argue that manufacturing processes such
as just in time inventory systems, small lot production, and decentralization of
responsibility for quality control to production workers all depend on achieving
human resource inputs of high levels of skill, training, motivation, and
participation. A key design feature of these manufacturing processes is that
technology is broadly defined to encompass these human resource dimensions.
They describe this as a "fragile" production system since it depends on
maintaining high levels of performance from the human resource management
system. In contrast, the traditional North American approach to manufacturing
policy has been to minimize variability through machine control and provision of
buffers against human resource system variability (i.e., extra employees to cope
with higher absenteeism, buffer inventories to protect against delivery
bottlenecks, sophisticated quality control inspection systems and specialized
personnel to catch defects after production is completed or as parts enter a
plant from an external supplier, etc.).
Successful integration of manufacturing and human resource strategies
generally argues for a moderate, incremental approach to new technology
investments thereby insuring that the workforce is ready to accept and absorb
the new approaches. This point was emphasized in an interview with the
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manager of a new Japanese-owned assembly plant in Canada. He described this
plant as approximately 20 to 30% from the "frontier" of potential automation.
His strategy was to start with the best "man-machine" combination and to
upgrade the manufacturing process incrementally from there as opportunities for
improving performance were identified. As part of this strategy each new
employee was required to work on the assembly line for a period of time before
taking a permanent job assignment. The purpose was to insure that everyone in
the organization understood how cars were built. This was seen as especially
important for the engineers who would work on the design and implementation
of future technologies and related process improvements.
An integrated approach to technology and human resource policy also
argues for significant involvement of worker (user) representatives at early
stages of the technological choice process. Thomas (1988) has shown that in
the absence of this early involvement, the requisite socio-technical principles
are not likely to be taken into account.
The concepts that underlie the Shimada and MacDuffie model are not
entirely new. Indeed to some extent they build on assumptions similar to those
found in socio-technical design models (Economic Council of Canada, 1987).
They go beyond these models, however, since socio-tech models tend to center
in on a single strategy for organizing work--the semi-autonomous work group.
A careful analysis of Japanese and U.S. team plant systems indicates that there
remains considerable variability in work organization design. In fact,
interdependence and coordination of work flow across groups is emphasized
more than individual or group autonomy.
Despite the growing awareness of these concepts and despite a number of
highly visible examples of the benefits associated with these alternative designs
in both Canada and the U.S., the evidence to date is that these principles are
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not diffusing rapidly. Conference Board survey data from U.S. firms reported
that between 20 to 30% of new non-union plants are being designed with
features such as semi-autonomous work groups (Kochan, Katz and McKersie,
1986). A recent study in Canada found that only 23% of the firms sampled
indicated that labor-management teams participated in the introduction of new
technologies (Economic Council of Canada, 1987). Even within the U.S. auto
industry, where the major firms are generally convinced these concepts are
essential for achieving their productivity and quality targets, the diffusion
process is gradual. Most new plants opened or retrofitted in recent years by
GM, Ford, Chrysler, or Japanese firms have introduced these principles.
However, the majority of existing plants continue to operate with traditional
systems.
The above evidence pertains largely to the effects of new technologies on
blue collar work organization. Evidence is mounting, however, that many of the
same problems with over-specialization in the organization of work among
engineers and technical staff limits the speed of introduction of new product
and process technologies. Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto (1987) have shown that it
takes on average 40% longer and 50% more manhours of engineering to design a
new model in U.S. auto firms than in Japanese auto firms. Mansfield (1987)
reaches a similar conclusion based on data from a broader sample of industries.
His estimates show that while there is wide variability across industries, on
average, U.S. firms take approximately 12% longer than comparable Japanese
firms to introduce new products. Based on a comparative study of engineering
processes in Japanese and U.S. computer firms Westney (1986) argues that part
of the Japanese advantage may lie in differences in the organization of
internal labor markets in the two countries. For example, compared to their
American counterparts, Japanese engineers get exposed to both design and
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manufacturing activities very early in their careers and can generally expect to
move from design to manufacturing as part of their normal career progression.
This give engineers in both functional areas increased awareness and
appreciation for the concerns and perspectives of the other and facilitates
problem solving in cross functional groups.
Other studies of the product development process have shown that problem
solving and group performance are critical determinants of the performance of
product and process development teams (Ancona, 1988; Tyre, 1988; Henderson,
1988). The Henderson (1988) study examined the effects of different patterns
of interaction and involvement of users and designers in the various stages of
information systems development projects. He found that the best performing
design teams were ones where both users and information systems specialists
exerted high, mutual influence on each other during the problem formulation,
solution, and implementation stages of the process. This finding again
reinforces the conclusion that effective cross-functional problem solving is as
important a requirement of the human resource management system for white
collar and technical occupational groups as it is for the system that governs
blue collar production workers.
The above examples from the production and engineering activities
illustrate the growing importance of learning from other countries and finding
ways to transfer practices from one cultural and institutional setting to another.
Indeed, the success of the transplant auto firms (Japanese firms operating
plants in the U.S. and Canada) suggests that transfer of learning is possible.
Yet transfer requires more than imitation of the structurial principles or
institutions. For example, there is widespread agreement among auto industry
executives that team forms of work organization similar to team structures
commonly found in Japanese manufacturing plants are more efficient than the
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traditional multiple classification and hierarchical control models found in
traditional North American plants. Yet one recent study showed wide variability
in the performance of team plants in a large U.S. firm (Katz, Kochan, and
Keefe, 1987). Further analysis of these data showed that the most successful
team plants in this company were once again plants that followed a moderate
technology upgrading strategy with a heavy emphasis on worker participation
and joint union-management governance processes. The two team plants with
these features were among the top productivity and quality plants in the
company. The high technology team plants were among the lowest productivity
and quality performers in the company. This suggests that one must again
look at the interaction among the technology strategies and the actual problem
solving and governance processes at work in the plants. These examples
suggest the need for more research on the factors that influence the success of
the cross cultural learning and transfer of organizational innovations and human
resource practices.
Labor Force Developments
An individual firm or a national economy can only gain competitive
advantage from effective use of human resources if it has a highly educated,
skilled, and adaptable labor force. In the absence of a high quality labor force,
all of the institutional and organizational adaptations in industrial relations
discussed in this paper are unlikely to bear fruit.
While historically firms in both Canada and the U.S. firms could count on
this source of competitive advantage, one should not assume this will
automatically be the case in the future. Indeed, there is sufficient concern
over the quality of education and training in the U.S. to make this one of the
most widely discussed human resource issues of the day. The warning signs in
the U.S. educational system are quite clear: (1) a twenty-five percent high
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school dropout rate; (2) a proportionate decline in college majors in science and
engineering, and; (3) weak performance of American students compared to Asian
and European students on mathematics and science achievement examinations.
Equal but less well documented concerns have been raised about the adequacy
of investments in training for those already in the labor market, and especially
for blue collar workers who are most exposed to the risk of permanent job loss
due to changes in technology. These concerns arise both out of the evidence
on the poor reemployment prospects of displaced workers with little education
and/or general training (Kruse, 1988) and the general belief that American
firms under-invest in training (Osterman, 1988). Underinvestment is in part
thought to reflect the narrow job classifications and rigid rules governing
movement in typical U.S. internal labor markets.
Similar concerns have been raised in Canadian policy circles, however, the
available evidence seems to indicate that the Canadian education and labor
market institutions have performed more effectively than their U.S. counterparts
over the past several decades. There is no evidence in the data available, for
example, of a decline in the quality of education in Canada or in the proportion
of students entering the science and engineering disciplines (Davies, 1986).
Moreover, Canadian labor market adjustment policies and/or market forces
appear to work better than do the U.S., if judged by the proportion of
aggregate unemployment attributable to structural versus cyclical causes
(Riddell, 1986). Thus, there is some reason to believe that the Canadian labor
force is better positioned to adjust to the technical and organizational changes
that are critical to the future performance of the economy and to individual
employment security and earnings potential.
Considerable concern and uncertainty remains, however, with respect to
the adequacy of private sector on the job training efforts. No more is known
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about the adequacy of the amount, quality, or generalizability of private
training in Canada than is known about these efforts in the U.S. There is
general agreement that private sector training will take on increased
importance in the future. Some have argued, however, that government policies
have overemphasized support for primary and college education at the expense
of continued training for those already in the labor force (Riddell, 1986). Yet,
as in the U.S., there is no clear consensus on how government can most
efficiently spur greater investment in training by workers, firms, and/or unions.
Clearly, this is an issue that deserves (and is very likely to get) considerable
attention from researchers and policy makers in both Canada and the U.S. in
the years ahead.
The most significant labor force development of the past two decades in
not only Canada and the U.S. but more generally in all industrialized countries
has been the growth in the number of women in the labor force. Labor force
participation rates of women in the U.S. increased from 36% in 1960 to 56% in
1988. The numbers for Canada are similar: from 28% in 1960 to 54% in 1986.
When the increased role of women is combined with the growth in the number
of minorities and immigrants it is clear that the labor force of the future will
be more diverse in demographic features than the labor force of the past.
Estimates in the U.S., for example, indicate that between 1987 and 2000 nearly
90% of the new labor force entrants will be women, minorities, or immigrants
(Johnston and Packer, 1987). The diversity poses challenges to industrial
relations and human resource practices since women, minorities, and immigrants
have historically experienced difficulty gaining access to those good jobs that
will be growing in demand.
The concern over the effects of immigration is especially central in
Canada given that over 20% of the Canadian labor force is foreign born. While
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a large proportion of these immigrants are from the U.S., recent evidence
suggests that immigrants' earnings are significantly lower than those of
comparable native born Canadians. This differential appears to be growing,
although there is still uncertainty (as in the U.S) over the causes of the growth
in the differential. A portion appears to be due to a decline in the quality of
the recent immigrant cohort, however, a portion also appears to be attributable
to language deficiencies and other constraints on the ability of immigrants to
learn skills required to advance to higher paying jobs (Hiscott, 1987; Borjas,
198?). This is similar to evidence from the U.S. indicating that women and
minority youth receive relatively less on the job training than their white male
counterparts and experience proportionately lower rates of return to the
training they do receive (Lynch, 1988). These results pose significant challenges
to policy makers and practitioners alike given the growing consensus regarding
the importance of training and life long learning to long term income, and the
projected demographic mix of future labor force entrants.
Union and Management Responses
Debates over the future of worker representation are intense in the U.S.
for quite obvious reasons. Since 1960 union representation has fallen from just
under one third of non-farm labor force to under 17%. Less than 15% of the
private sector workforce is unionized. But even these numbers understate the
extent of the crisis facing the American labor movement. Union membership
continues to be concentrated in the oldest, slowest growth industries, in the
older firms and establishments in these industries, and in occupations that are
likely to experience continued shrinkage from technological change. At the
same time, traditional union organizing efforts have failed to capture
significant numbers of new members among those work groups and occupations
that are expanding--women, white collar workers, and service sector employees.
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Many are quick to point out that the U.S. is an exceptional case and note
that both the historical experience and current situation of the Canadian labor
movement are quite different. Union membership in Canada has grown during
the same thirty year time period as the U.S. movement has declined. Qverall
membership appears to have remained quite stable even through the tumultuous
period of the 1980s. For example, Statistics Canada survey data for 1984 show
37% of paid workforce is unionized and 42% is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. These overall figures, however, mask some trends that
are similar in direction if not in magnitude to the U.S. experience. For
example, most of the growth in union membership in recent years has been in
the public sector while union membership in the private economy declined from
33% in 1961 to 28% in 1984 (Betcherman, 1988).
But membership numbers and trends are only one dimension of the
challenge facing unions today. Unions in all advanced industrialized countries
are undergoing internal debates and self analyses over how to represent workers
in light of the changes discussed in earlier sections of this paper (Kane and
Marsden, 1988; Edwards, 1986; Roberts, 1985). Globalization, new technology,
and changing industry and demographic composition along with the strategic
responses of employers are challenging many of the traditional structures and
processes of unionism and collective bargaining. Thus, the
challenges to labor in Canada as in other countries lie not only in organizing
new members but also in making the adaptations necessary to effectively
represent their members' interests. The question, then, is what can we learn
from the responses to date of unions to these environmental, political, and
employer challenges?
Both Canadian and U.S. union leaders have been criticized for being slow
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to respond to these pressures to change or to initiate innovations in practice.
Instead, management has initiated most of the innovations in industrial relations
in recent years. At least three reasons account for the reluctance of North
American union leaders to initiate innovations in representation and
participation.
First, there is the strong legal and historical tradition of management
rights built into our collective bargaining systems: Management acts and unions
react through negotiation over the impacts of managerial decisions and through
the grievance and arbitration procedures. This legal doctrine and tradition of
separation of managerial rights from union influence has deterred unions from
playing an active role in strategic managerial decision-making. Second, at the
shop floor North American unionism has followed a "job control" model of
specifying clear lines of demarcation of jobs, detailed rights of workers that are
tied to job and union jurisdictions and in some industries occupational or craft
lines. This tradition grew out of the Taylorist concepts and, as noted earlier,
apply not only to union members but carryover to engineering and managerial
functions as well. Thus, flexibility in work organization requires significant
departures from this job control tradition. Third, there is an innate and
legitimate lack of trust of management among U.S. union leaders that grows out
of the long history of anti-union sentiment within the American management
culture. American employers would not only prefer to be nonunion but over
the long course of history have been aggressive and successful in developing
and pursuing nonunion options. This lack of trust is reinforced in the current
period by the fact that many of the innovations in work organization and
employee participation have been used by nonunion firms in part to avoid
unionization. Even where union avoidance is not the dominant motive for
introducing these innovations, their effect has been to reduce the incentive for
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workers to organize. Therefore, unions have had no success in organizing these
innovative firms. An understanding of this context is critical, therefore, to
interpreting the current and future response of union leaders to organizational
innovations. Thus, a review of the changes in the responses of union leaders
may be helpful.
The Evolving Response of U.S. Unions. The initial impetus for a new
union response in the U.S. came in the mid 1970s as the quality of working life
movement and related forms of employee participation gained momentum in
academic, government, and management circles. Initially, the vast majority of
U.S. union leaders were quite skeptical of these early employee involvement or
quality of working life efforts fearing that these were simply another
managerial fad or effort to undermine union solidarity and support. Union
leader skepticism was reinforced by the fact that up to that point most of
these activities were associated with nonunion companies and were initiated in
part to keep workers from organizing. However, a small number of union
leaders did advocate these efforts (see for example, Bluestone, 1980) and
therefore by the early 1980s considerable joint union-management
experimentation was underway. Enough experience with these efforts has
occurred for union leaders to now take a more careful look at the risks and
opportunities posed by employee involvement and related workplace innovations.
Moreover, the scope and impacts of these innovations have broadened out
considerably. Employee participation seldom stands apart from efforts to
introduce greater flexibility in work organization, information sharing and
consultation at higher levels of the union management relationship, and in some
cases worker and union involvement in the planning of new facilities or new
technologies or production systems. In fact the most recent surveys now show
that the rate of diffusion of employee participation, information sharing, and
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related workplace innovations is not significantly different between union and
non-union plants (Ichniowski, Lewin, and Delaney, 1988). Still, however, there
is an active debate within the American labor movement over how to best
respond to these issues. While some continue to see employee participation and
team based work systems as dangerous departures from longstanding union
traditions and principles that should be opposed (Parker, 1988), others see them
as potential opportunities for representing worker interests in today's
environment (Ephlin, 1988).
The greatest support for innovations is found among leaders at the local
and national levels of unions most heavily threatened by foreign competition
and where unions have been strong and secure enough to gain a partnership
role with management in introducing and administering organizational
innovations. Moreover, at the local levels of these unions there is equal
diversity in outlooks.
Yet in the midst of this diversity there is consensus among union leaders
on a few basic principles that must be in place if these innovations are to gain
their support and are to diffuse to broader settings. First, unions must be
accepted by management as legitimate and full partners in the design and
guidance of these efforts. Second, there must be a greater acceptance on the
part of American management of workers' rights to organize and of the
legitimacy of unions in society and in their organizations.- Union leaders note
that American managers cannot continue to have it both ways--they cannot
expect union leader cooperation at the workplace at the same time corporate
strategies are designed to oppose unionization of new employees or
establishments. Third, union leaders are convinced that changes in national
labor policy are required to reestablish a "level playing field" with respect to
new union organizing. The emerging view of union leaders therefore seems to
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be one of recognizing the potential contributions that organizational innovations
can play in improving both the interests of workers, employers and the broader
economy, however, they would prefer to see these innovations embodied as part
of a broader national reform of industrial relations law, ideology, and politics.
For these reasons, the extent to which these innovations will diffuse in the
future lies to a large extent in the hands of the future political leaders of the
country.
Views of Canadian Union Leaders. In the past two decades the Canadian
labor movement has gradually separated itself from the AFL-CIO in political
strategy, and in the case of several individual Canadian unions, in
organizational structure (Adams, 1988). The close ties of the Canadian Labor
Congress and the New Democratic Party, for example, depart from the AFL-
CIO's policy of more informal or unofficial ties to the Democratic Party.
Differences can also be seen in the views of Canadian union leaders toward
workplace innovations.
A recent interview study (Kumar, 1988) suggests that Canadian union
leaders in general are still quite skeptical of the value of many of the
organizational innovations in work practices, employee participation, and
representation in strategic managerial decision-making and even broad based
tripartite consultation among labor, management, and government officials.
Kumar (1988;8-9) summarizes the views of the 17 top level union leaders he
interviewed as follows:
Union leaders are convinced that management attempts towards employee
involvement, and demands for greater flexibility in work arrangements are
nothing but a 'misguided desire for a union free environment.' They are
of the view that 'management is more interested in speed up, more
productivity than in the worker input.' Labor leaders strongly believe in
the adversarial system of labor relations citing the fundamentally different
roles of union and management at the workplace. Participation in
management decision-making initiative, according to them, are largely cost
driven, motivated by management's desire to abdicate its responsibility by
transferring to the union the role of disciplining workers, setting one
29
III
worker against the other.
As their American counterparts, however, these Canadian union leaders do
appear to hold out the option of greater flexibility in view and behavior in the
future, if, in their view, the necessary changes in managerial attitude occurs.
Although labor leaders espouse an adversarial union culture, they are not
opposed to cooperation with employers on areas of mutual concern. They
believe, however, that cooperation is only possible if employers seek
genuine dialogue, share information and are honest in their dealings with
the union and the worker. Most labor leaders don't think employers
accept the legitimacy of the union. There has been no change in employer
attitudes towards workers, they point out. Against this background, they
think cooperation is only feasible at the strategic policy level on broader
issues like trade, labor adjustment and technology , in situations where
collective bargaining relationships are long established and mature, and
where there is a strong union representing the industry. Working together
is feasible, they believe, if management were seriously committed to the
change.
A recent review of workplace innovation in Canada (Mansell, 1988) supported
the conclusion that the majority of Canadian union leaders continue to oppose
workplace innovations citing in support "anti QWL" convention resolutions
passed in 1982 and 1983 by the Ontario and the British Columbia Federations of
Labor. Yet despite the rhetorical opposition of top union leaders, innovations
continue in selected settings with local unions leaders as active and in some
cases enthusiastic participants and advocates.
Thus, in all likelihood we will continue to experience a period of intense
political debate within both the Canadian and the U.S. labor movements over
these innovations. While there seems to be somewhat greater experience with
innovations at the local level in the U.S. and more national union leaders in the
U.S. see innovations that are properly structured as viable strategies for unions
to promote and champion, neither labor movement has developed a coherent and
visible program for promoting, supporting, and diffusing these changes.
The lack of strong open support by union leaders for new forms of labor
management relations does not imply that a management led process of
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adjustment to new technologies and efforts to introduce greater flexibility in
work organization will not occur. Indeed, both survey data and two recent case
studies of Canadian firms (Adams, 1988b; Chaykowski and Slotsve, 1988) suggest
that the introduction of new technologies and industrial restructuring are
occurring in unionized relationships, albeit without significant input from labor
leaders. Using data from the WWT survey Betcherman (1987) found no
significant difference between union and nonunion firms in (1) the rate of
technological change, and (2) the degree to which workers were involved in the
process of introducing technological change. Moreover this study found that
technological changes in union firms were less likely to result in skill
enhancements or the creation of new jobs than were changes in nonunion firms.
These results are rather sobering since they imply that Canadian unions have
not either attempted to or been successful in influencing the process or
outcomes of technological change in ways that are beneficial to their members.
Even the fact that these data suggest unions do not deter or slowdown the
introduction of new technology is of little consolation since one would expect
existence of union wage premiums to lead to a faster rate of technological
change in union than in nonunion firms.
A case study of the process of restructuring in a large Canadian steel
plant (Adams, 1988b) concluded that both the company and the union acted in
traditional ways. They bargained hard in contract negotiations over changes in
wages, work rules, and employment adjustment provisions and then used existing
contract administration procedures to implement the changes agreed to. A
similar pattern described in a case study of the process of technological
change in a large manufacturing firm reinforces the survey results (Chaykowski
and Slotsve, 1988). In this organization management has followed an aggressive
strategy of investing in new technologies and in the process has successfully
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negotiated with the local union to reduce the numbers of job classifications and
to reorganize work to better fit the new equipment.
Thus in these cases one again observed the union following a traditional
strategy of negotiating to cushion the impacts of technological change on the
workers affected and leaving to managerial initiative the decisions about how to
reconfigure jobs and related organizational policies to support the new
technologies. In turn, management took an equally traditional approach to the
process of technological change. No effort was made to take a socio-technical
approach to the design of the technology or the job structure. Instead the
technical and industrial relations and human resource management dimensions of
the change process were separated and addressed in a standard, sequential
fashion. If the experience of U.S. firms generalizes to these cases, we can
conclude that the full potential benefits of the new technology to these two
firms, their workers, and their union were not realized. If the survey and case
study results summarized above reflect accurately current practices in Canadian
labor-management relations, then this conclusion may have even wider
generalizability.
Human Resource Management
One of the major conclusions of our research on -U.S. industrial relations
has been that innovations in human resource management practices in the
nonunion sector during the 1970s served as an important stimulus to union-
management innovation in the 1980s (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986). The
lack of comparable data on Canadian management practices makes it difficult to
draw any definitive conclusions on the nature of human resource practices in
nonunion firms in Canada. Clearly, as in the U.S. there are a number of highly
visible nonunion firms (e.g., Magna Corporation, Michelin, Dofasco Steel, etc)
that have been quite successful in avoiding unionization and that have a
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reputation for innovative practices. Yet, the impression is that Canadian
managers in both the union and nonunion sector have been less aggressive than
their U.S. counterparts in initiating human resource management innovations
(Adams, 1988a). The results of the WWT survey and another survey of
management practices in British Columbia (Thompson and Verma, 1987) are
consistent with this impression. Yet more data are needed before this
"impression" should be accepted as fact. However, one interpretation of the
evidence that is available is that Canadian managers are, like their U.S.
counterparts in the late 1970s, under pressures from their senior management
colleagues to accelerate the pace of change and innovation in human resource
management. If this is true, a significant escalation in competitive pressures on
the Canadian economy may unleash these pressures and produce more aggressive
actions by Canadian employers. On the other hand, there may be more
incremental change occurring in human resource management in Canada that is
less visible to outside observers. The fact that no concrete conclusion can be
reached on the basis of the available evidence of the nature and impacts of
Canadian human resource practices suggests that this is another important area
in need of further research and policy analysis.
Implications for the Future of Canadian Industrial Relations
The above comparison of the responses of the in U.S. and Canadian
industrial relations systems suggests the following tentative conclusions:
1. Most of the changes in practice observed in the U.S. are also
occurring in Canada. Like the U.S., these changes have not diffused widely
across the economy to the point that a "new" system is in place. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that the process of change or transformation in industrial
relations and human resource practices has been slower, more incremental, and
less widely diffused in Canada than in the U.S. Specifically:
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a. The rate of increase in collective bargaining settlements has
moderated although the change is not as great as in the U.S.
b. Contingent compensation practices are not popular with union
leaders while employers show little interest in initiating the
organizational changes required for contingent incentive systems to
be adopted and supported by workers and union leaders.
c. Growth in union membership in the private sector has leveled off,
however, it has not fallen precipitously as in the U.S.
d. Unions have had very limited success in organizing employees in
firms that follow state of the art human resource management
practices although there appear to be fewer firms that use these
practices to avoid unions in Canada than in the U.S.
e. A number of local unions are participating in experiments with
labor management cooperation, worker participation, and flexible
forms of work organization although these innovations do not appear
to be as widespread or to have as many local level advocates at this
point in time as in the U.S.
f. National union leaders remain rather uniformly skeptical of
management's motives for introducing labor management innovations
and therefore are not willing to endorse or champion these
innovations.
g. Unions oppose the Canadian U.S. free trade agreement because
they fear the loss of jobs to U.S. nonunion firms and/or the growth
of a U.S. hard line style of management in Canada.
h. Canadian unions have taken conventional approaches to corporate
restructuring and technological change efforts by neither blocking nor
by seeking to participate actively in the management decision-making
processes that guide such efforts.
i. Canadian immigrants and other minorities are experiencing
difficulty in gaining access to the training and jobs required to
improve their incomes and occupational status.
2. The processes by which these changes are introduced differ from the
experiences in the U.S. in two interrelated ways. First, the non-union sector
seems to be less of a source of human resource management innovation that is
pressuring unionized firms to match their lead. Second, where changes are
occurring in union firms, the changes are coming through the normal bargaining
and contract administration process. There appear to be fewer examples of
formal programs in labor management cooperation and participation at the
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workplace and even fewer examples of union leaders playing a significant role
at the strategic level of managerial decision-making.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the same pressures that are
affecting industrial relations in the U.S. and other advanced industrial
economies are at work in Canada and are producing experiments similar in kind
if not in magnitude or scope as in the U.S. This does not mean, however, that
Canada is destined to experience the same types of patterns of adjustment and
industrial relations turmoil as the U.S. Instead, the future path of diffusion of
innovations and adaptation will, as in the U.S. and other countries, depend on
the choices and strategies of management, labor, and government policy makers.
Thus in this section an attempt will be made to focus on the choices available
to each of these parties. In doing so a number of needs and opportunities for
further research and policy debate will be highlighted.
Choices for Management
Canadian employers do not appear to be as aggressive in stimulating
changes and adaptations in human resource practices as their U.S counterparts.
This has both advantages and disadvantages for the adaptation process. One
advantage is that while Canadian union leaders voice a degree of distrust of
management's motives, there is still a less hostile - labor-management social
climate in Canada than in the U.S. Therefore, Canadian managers are not as
limited by the ambivalent attitudes of many U.S. managers regarding the
decision of whether to attempt to work with or around unions in the adaptation
process.
Canadian managers will have to work more intensively with union leaders
if the adaptations in industrial relations noted at the outset of this article are
to be achieved. The alternative would be for management to invest in a twenty
year process of expanding the nonunion sector to the point where unions were
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sufficiently weakened where they could either be ignored or would be forced to
accept a secondary role in management controlled change processes. Setting
aside issues regarding the desirability of such a strategy, its feasibility is
doubtful given the size and political strength of the Canadian labor movement.
Therefore, Canadian managers will need to accelerate their efforts to promote
change and adaptation with union leaders either through the conventional
channels of negotiations and contract administration or by more active efforts
to develop new forums for consultation at the workplace, enterprise, industry,
and national levels. But there is no guarantee that managers will actually
choose to put more emphasis on achieving change by working with union
leaders. Some firms may increase their efforts to avoid unions. Thus,
achieving a better understanding of the factors that influence management's
choice of strategies and their consequences for individual firms, employees, and
the macro-economy should be high on the priority list of researchers and policy
makers.
If the popular view that cross functional communication, participation, and
integration in new product and process developments is accurate, Canadian
management, like their American counterparts, will need to make significant
changes in organizational structures and processes. These changes will involve
modifications in traditional power distributions and organizational boundaries.
If case study experiences from U.S. organizations are indicative, this will be a
highly intense political process and one that will only succeed if the
organizational culture and management reward structure reinforces the change
process.
Ultimately the direction of human resource policy in Canada will depend in
large part on the nature of the business strategies that Canadian firms adopt.
The more firms attempt to adapt to increased world competition and changing
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market conditions with strategies that emphasis product differentiation, product
quality, and innovation, the more demand there will be for the organizational
and human resource policy changes that support these strategies.
Choices for Union Leaders
Canadian union leaders have responded to pressures from their environment
and managerial initiatives for change in ways very similar to the way U.S.
union leaders reacted in the 1970s. This is does not imply that Canadian
leaders are simply behind their American counterparts. Instead it reflects the
stronger and more secure position of the Canadian labor movement, a position
similar to the perception most U.S. labor leaders had of their position in the
1970s. Thus given their greater strength and the less hostile managerial and
political environment in which they operate,Canadian union leaders have a wider
range of choices open to them than do their American counterparts at the
moment. This suggests that union leaders could adopt an active strategy and
lead the debate over how to adapt to change in ways that are consistent with
the interests of their members. Such an effort would need to be guided by a
vision of not only the role labor wishes to play at the national and provincial
levels of policy making but also the long run role unions want to play at the
workplace and in strategic managerial decision-making. The alternative
union strategy is to continue to hold to conventional views as to the adequacy
of collective bargaining for meeting these challenges. Adherence to this policy
is likely to lead to an increase in managerial militance and, in the end, to more
of the frustrations, disappointments, and membership declines experienced by
their U.S. counterparts.
One of the most difficult challenges and strategic choices facing not only
Canadian union leaders but union leaders in most countries is how to respond to
the increasingly diverse labor force. Collective bargaining has not proven to be
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sufficiently attractive to white collar, middle managers, temporary and part-
time workers, and employees in small enterprises to get them to organize in
large numbers. Yet all of these groups are growing at a faster rate than the
more highly organized the blue collar and professional groups. Does this imply
that new institutional forms of worker representation and participation need to
be pursued to supplement or complement collective bargaining? Do works
councils, board membership or other forms of non-exclusive representation have
merit and appeal in Canada? These questions have been raised by researchers
in Canada in recent years (Adams, 1986) but have not yet stimulated significant
discussion or experimentation. Thus, there is no way to answer these questions
at the moment in the absence of more open debate, experimentation, and
analysis. Yet, like their counterparts in other advanced industrial economies,
Canadian labor leaders are likely to find themselves deep in such debates in the
years ahead. Thus, stimulating and then evaluating the results of these debates
and the experimentation they might generate should be a high priority for
policy-makers and researchers.
Implications for Government Policy
Let us assume the underlying premise of this paper is accurate that
contemporary industrial relations practices need to be adapted in significant
ways if they are to contribute to a nation's competitiveness and the welfare of
its citizens. Further assume the basic conclusion from-this review of the
evidence is accurate that changes are underway but not widespread. Then the
fundamental challenge facing public policy makers in the years ahead lies in
diffusing and institutionalizing the necessary changes. Yet governments have
had very mixed records as promoters or catalysts of private sector innovations.
In the U.S., for example, efforts to develop and use a National Commission on
Productivity and Quality of Work basically failed for lack of enthusiastic
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support from either labor or management. The Ontario Quality of Working
Life Center seems to have experienced a similar weak level of union and
management support. Perhaps the tripartite labor market research boards that
are now underway will be more successful.
If experience in other countries is any guide, however, isolated initiatives
by government agencies to diffuse and institutionalize industrial relations
innovations are unlikely to have a major or lasting effect. Instead, just as
industrial relations reforms or innovations at the firm level require supporting
human resource policies and business strategies, national policy makers will need
to view industrial relations innovations as an integral part of Canada's long
term economic strategy.
Summary
For the past two decades the Canadian and U.S. systems of industrial
relations have diverged in important ways. Differences in union membership
trends, management human resource and industrial relations strategies, and the
political strategies of labor are the visible markers of the divergent patterns of
industrial relations between the two countries. Yet the pressures from changing
product markets, technologies, and labor force demographics affecting the two
systems are similar and are likely to intensify in Canada in the years ahead.
This suggests that the pace of change may also accelerate in the years ahead.
The means by which change occurs in Canada need not and is unlikely to
be the same as in the U.S. But if the conclusions of this paper are correct, to
avoid the adversarial aspects of the U.S. pattern of adaptation, labor,
management, and government policy makers in Canada will need to make
significant changes in their traditional beliefs and practices. Labor will need to
become more of a champion of innovation and adjustment at the workplace and
play a broader role in the management and governance of the enterprise.
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Management, in turn will need to accept a broader role of workers and their
representatives in the enterprise in return for the changes in the human
resource policies and practices it needs to compete in contemporary markets.
Government policy makers will need to see these industrial relations innovations
as critical to the performance of the national economy.
For these changes to in fact occur will require nothing short of a
fundamental rethinking of the nature of the corporation and the role that
employees and their representatives should play in its governance. It implies
acceptance of a stakeholder model of organizational change and governance.
Short of such a transformation in views, structures, and practices it is unlikely
that the rhetorical call for firms in Canada (or the U.S.) to use human
resources and technology for competitive advance will be turned into a reality.
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